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STAUB V. PROCTOR HOSPITAL: 
CLEANING UP THE CAT’S PAW 
HANNAH BANKS* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Based on a fable by Jean La Fontaine and introduced by Judge 
Richard Posner in 1990, the “cat’s paw” theory refers to a person who 
is duped into action in order to accomplish another’s purpose.1 Within 
the context of employment discrimination law, the cat’s paw theory 
seeks to deal with the ever-changing landscape of employer liability.2 
As company structures change, supervisory roles and decision-making 
capabilities often are spread out among a variety of individuals.3 Thus 
it becomes harder for a plaintiff to bring a case of discrimination 
when the person harboring discriminatory animus is not the same 
person that ultimately makes the adverse employment decision.4 
Staub v. Proctor Hospital5 is an employment discrimination case 
brought under the Uniformed Services Employment and 
Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA).6 In Staub, the employee 
seeks to hold his employer liable for the actions influenced by the 
anti-military animus of two of his supervisors, even though neither 
one ultimately made the decision to terminate his employment.7 
Although this is a USERRA case, its resolution is likely to affect the 
 
* 2012 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. Stephen F. Befort & Alison L. Olig, Within the Grasp of the Cat’s Paw: Delineating the 
Scope of Subordinate Bias Liability Under Federal Antidiscrimination Statutes, 60 S.C. L. REV. 
383, 385 (2008). 
 2. Id. at 384–85. 
 3. Id. See also Brief for Petitioner at 25–26, Staub v. Proctor Hosp., No. 09-400 (U.S. July 
2, 2010) (discussing the delegation of duties and separation of decision making from 
investigation). 
 4. Befort & Olig, supra note 1, at 384–85. 
 5. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 2089 (U.S. 
Apr. 19, 2010) (No. 09-400). 
 6. Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38 
U.S.C.A. §§ 4301–4335 (West 2011). 
 7. Staub, 560 F.3d at 655. 
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subordinate-liability standard for Title VII8 and other federal anti-
discrimination statutes.9 Due to a circuit split,10 the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.11 This is the Court’s second attempt12 at creating a 
uniform standard for the circuits and it is likely that the Court’s 
decision will seek to balance the goal of ending employment 
discrimination while recognizing the problems created by the 
hierarchies and intricacies of the modern workplace. 
II. FACTS 
Vincent Staub was employed as an angiography technician in the 
Diagnostic Imaging Department of Proctor Hospital (Proctor), 
located in Peoria, Illinois.13 He was simultaneously a member of the 
United States Army Reserves.14 As a result of his military service, 
Staub required a flexible schedule so that he could attend drill and 
training obligations that occupied one weekend a month and two 
weeks during the summer.15 For ten years, Staub balanced both sets of 
responsibilities without any significant disturbance.16 
Staub’s employment problems began in 2000 when Janice Mulally 
took over scheduling for the Diagnostic Imaging Department.17 At 
that time, Mulally, second in command of the department, and 
Michael Korenchuk, head of the department, resented Staub because 
of his military service and took actions based on that animus that 
resulted in his termination.18 As evidence of the discrimination, Staub 
cites incidents in which Mulally purposefully created conflicts 
between his civilian and military obligations, required him to use 
vacation time for his drills, scheduled him for additional shifts, and 
 
 
 8. Title VII, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (West 2011). 
 9. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 21, Staub v. 
Proctor Hosp., No. 09-400 (U.S. July 9, 2010). 
 10. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2688 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring) (“There is a 
large body of court of appeals case law on this issue, and these cases disagree about the proper 
standard.”). 
 11. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 130 S. Ct. 2089 (2010) (mem.). 
 12. See infra text accompanying note 87. 
 13. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647, 650–51 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 
2089 (U.S. Apr. 19, 2010) (No. 09-400). 
 14. Id. at 651. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 651–52. 
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publicly posted requests for people to cover Staub’s shifts, making 
him appear irresponsible to his coworkers.19 
Both Mulally and Korenchuk made discriminatory remarks about 
Staub’s military service.20 Mulally stated that the extra shifts were 
Staub’s way of “paying back the department for everyone else having 
to bend over backwards to cover [his] schedule for the reserves”21 and 
called his military duties “bullshit.”22 Korenchuk made similar 
statements regarding Staub’s duties, calling the drill weekends “a 
b[u]nch of smoking and joking and [a] waste of taxpayers[’] money.”23 
Mulally continued to express her discontent with Staub’s military 
obligations by commenting to one of Staub’s coworkers, Leslie 
Sweborg, that his military duties were a “strain on the[] department,” 
and asked Sweborg to help get rid of him.24 
On January 27, 2004, Staub received a written warning from 
Mulally accusing him of “shirking his duties” and disappearing 
without notice.25 Both Staub and one of his coworkers dispute the 
events of the day that resulted in the warning.26 The warning required 
him to “remain in the general diagnostic area” unless he notified 
Korenchuk or Mulally of his plans and reasons for leaving.27 
On April 20, 2004, Proctor fired Staub for violating the January 27 
written warning.28 Korenchuk reported that he was unable to locate 
Staub during his shift, but Staub asserted that he had followed the 
procedures laid out in the warning by calling to let Korenchuk know 
that he would be in the hospital cafeteria eating lunch.29 Staub was 
escorted to the office of Chief Operating Officer Linda Buck by 
Korenchuk and a security guard, and was fired on the spot.30 Earlier 
that day, Buck had already listened to Korenchuk’s complaint about 
Staub’s failure to abide by the previous warning and reviewed 
previous incidents and Staub’s file.31 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 652. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 652–53. 
 26. Id. at 653. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 654. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
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Staub filed a grievance with Proctor following his termination, 
arguing that Mulally’s fabrication of the incident resulted in the 
January 27 written warning.32 Buck again reviewed Staub’s personnel 
file and previous reports of Staub’s problems working with other 
Proctor employees and denied his grievance.33 Buck did not speak 
with other current angiography technologists or investigate Staub’s 
claim that Mulally had a military animus.34 Buck herself harbored no 
animus toward Staub as a result of his status in the military.35 
Staub filed an employment discrimination suit based on his 
military status under USERRA.36 The trial court allowed the jury to 
hear all evidence of animus against Staub by Korenchuk and Mulally 
and then instructed the jury under the Seventh Circuit’s cat’s paw 
theory of “singular influence” that “[a]nimosity of a co-worker . . . on 
the basis of [Staub’s] military status as a motivating factor may not be 
attributed to [Proctor] unless the co-worker exercised such singular 
influence over the decision-maker that the co-worker was basically 
the real decision[-]maker.”37 The jury also was also instructed that if 
the decision maker conducted an independent investigation, the 
employer was not liable for the discriminatory animus of a non-
decision maker.38 The jury found for Staub and concluded that Proctor 
had not proved that Staub would have been fired “regardless of his 
military status.”39 The court denied Proctor’s motion for judgment as a 
matter of law. Proctor appealed on the grounds that the district court 
misapplied the singular-influence standard by allowing insufficient 
evidence of non-decision maker animus and incorrectly instructed the 
jury.40 
 
 32. Id. at 655. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 654–55. 
 35. Id. at 655. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Brief for the United States, supra note 9, at 6. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647, 655 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 2089 
(U.S. Apr. 19, 2010) (No. 09-400). 
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. USERRA 
USERRA was enacted in 1994 to protect part-time members of 
the military from employment discrimination while they continued 
their civilian careers and fulfilled their military responsibilities.41 
Similar to the language in Title VII,42 USERRA states that an 
employer is subject to liability if an employee’s military service “is a 
motivating factor in the employer’s [adverse] action, unless the 
employer can prove that the action would have been taken in the 
absence of such membership . . . .”43 USERRA’s definition of 
employer includes “a person, institution, organization, or other entity 
to whom the employer has delegated the performance of 
employment-related responsibilities.”44 Courts generally interpret 
USERRA according to the standards applicable to Title VII and 
other federal anti-discrimination statutes.45 
B. Traditional Employment Discrimination Tests 
The traditional test for determining employer liability in 
employment discrimination cases originated in the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.46 Under the McDonnell 
Douglas burden-shifting framework, the burden is on the plaintiff to 
make out a prima facie case by showing that: (1) he is a member of 
the protected class; (2) he was meeting his employer’s legitimate 
expectations; (3) an adverse employment action was taken against 
him; and (4) circumstances exist that give rise to an inference of 
discrimination.47 If the plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie 
 
 41. USERRA, Pub. L. No. 103-353, 108 Stat. 3149 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 
4301–4335 (West 2011)). 
 42. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m) (West 2011) (“An unlawful employment practice is 
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice . . . .”). 
 43. 38 U.S.C.A. § 4311(c)(1). 
 44. Id. § 4303(4)(A)(i). 
 45. Brief for the United States, supra note 9, at 21. 
 46. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 47. See id. at 802 (holding that a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case “by showing (i) that 
he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the 
employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) 
that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek 
applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications”). 
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case, a rebuttable presumption of discrimination is established.48 The 
burden then shifts to the defendant to show that there was a 
“legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the adverse action.49 If this 
burden of production is met, the plaintiff must then demonstrate that 
the employer’s proffered reasons are only a pretext for 
discrimination.50 
This standard was adapted to “mixed-motive” cases in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.51 Under the Price Waterhouse test, when 
membership in a protected class is one of several motives for the 
adverse employment action, the employer can avoid liability by 
establishing the “same decision” affirmative defense—that the 
adverse action would have been taken irrespective of the employee’s 
protected status.52 Congress modified the Price Waterhouse decision 
with the Civil Rights Act of 1991.53 This Act amended Title VII to 
provide that “an unlawful employment practice is established when 
the complaining party demonstrates that [the protected characteristic] 
was a motivating factor for any employment practice . . . .”54 Congress 
chose the motivating factor language over alternatives (such as a 
substantial factor or a substantial motivating factor) arguably to allow 
the statute to reach a broader realm of discrimination.55 In order to 
balance out broader employer liability, the Act also added a provision 
that forbids certain types of damages and injunctive relief that places 
the employee back in the job when the employer proves the “same 
decision” affirmative defense.56 The Act reframed the affirmative 
defense as interpreted by the Supreme Court from a liability-escaping 
mechanism to one that merely limits an employer’s damages. 
 
 48. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (explaining that under 
the McDonnell Douglas framework, “[e]stablishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a 
presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee”). 
 49. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–03. 
 50. Id. at 804. 
 51. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1075 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 
2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g) (West 2011)). 
 52. Id. at 244–45. 
 53. Befort & Olig, supra note 1, at 399. 
 54. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m) (emphasis added). 
 55. Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of Causation 
in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 505–10 (2006) (discussing the history behind “a 
motivating factor” and how it differs from “a substantial factor”). 
 56. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
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C. Agency Law in Employment Discrimination Cases 
In addition to its decisions on the standards for causation, the 
Supreme Court has also heard cases on the application of common 
law agency principles in the employment discrimination context. In 
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,57 the Court applied principles of 
agency law and vicarious liability to a hostile work environment 
harassment case.58 The Court held that under the “aided in the agency 
relation standard,” an employer is “subject to vicarious liability to a 
victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by 
a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over 
the employee.”59 The Court concluded that an employer would always 
be held vicariously liable when a tangible employment action was 
taken against the aggrieved employee, but liability could also exist 
when no such action was taken.60 When an employee has not suffered 
a tangible employment action, the employer can prove the affirmative 
defense that it took reasonable measures to prevent or promptly 
correct the harassment and that the employee “unreasonably failed to 
take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities 
provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”61 The Court’s 
reasoning relied on policy implications and the purpose of Title VII to 
encourage employers to form their own procedures to eliminate 
discrimination.62 
D. The History and Variations of the Cat’s Paw Doctrine 
Theories of agency liability are also used in non-harassment 
employment discrimination cases. Under subordinate-bias liability, 
known as the cat’s paw theory, an employer may be held liable when 
an adverse employment action was taken by a person who held no 
animus, but was influenced or relied on information provided by a 
biased subordinate.63 The cat’s paw first was used as a legal theory in 
 
 57. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 58. Id. at 764–65. See also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) 
(decided the same day at Ellerth and standing for the same premise). 
 59. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
 60. Id. at 763. 
 61. Id. at 765. 
 62. Id. at 764 (with Title VII Congress sought to “encourage the creation of antiharassment 
policies and effective grievance mechanisms” and the EEOC’s policy is to “encourag[e] the 
development of grievance procedures”). 
 63. See infra notes 65–87 and accompanying text. 
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Shager v. Upjohn.64 In an opinion written by Judge Posner, the 
Seventh Circuit held that a material issue of fact existed where a 
committee decision could have been tainted by a supervisor’s age-
based discriminatory recommendation.65 The court concluded that if 
the committee relied on the biased advice of the supervisor, the 
committee’s own lack of animus “would not spare the company from 
liability.”66 
All of the federal circuits currently recognize some variation of 
the cat’s paw doctrine.67 The different tests can be grouped into three 
categories: (1) the actual decision-maker standard; (2) the input or 
influence standard; and (3) the causation standard. The actual 
decision-maker standard is the strictest standard and is the most 
difficult for plaintiffs to meet.68 Used most notably by the Fourth 
Circuit in Hill v. Lockheed Martin,69 this standard requires the 
subordinate to possess a “supervisory or disciplinary authority” and 
be “the one principally responsible for the decision” for an employer 
to be held liable.70 In other words, the subordinate must be the actual 
or functional decision maker in order for the employer to be liable for 
the subordinate’s actions.71 Focusing on the power of the subordinate, 
this standard depends on a narrow interpretation of agency law. 
The input or influence standard is the most lenient and is used in 
some form by the majority of circuits.72 Under this standard, the focus 
is on whether an employee with discriminatory animus provided or 
withheld information that could have affected the ultimate decision,73 
substantially influenced the decision maker,74 or closely participated 
 
 64. Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 65. Id. at 401. 
 66. Id. at 405. 
 67. Befort & Olig, supra note 1, at 389. 
 68. See infra text accompanying notes 70 and 71. 
 69. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 70. Id. at 291. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See infra notes 73–76 and accompanying text. 
 73. See Simpson v. Diversitech Gen., Inc., 945 F.2d 156, 160 (6th Cir. 1991) (“If [the biased 
official] initiated the disciplinary action . . . simply showing that [the biased official] had no role 
in the ‘final’ decision is insufficient to establish that [the employer] would have made the same 
decision absent the racial animus.”); Gee v. Principi, 289 F.3d 342, 347 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding 
liability when biased supervisors “made comments critical” of the plaintiff at a hiring meeting). 
 74. See Rose v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 257 F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding 
“comments made directly to her on more than one occasion by her immediate supervisor, who 
had enormous influence in the decision-making process” to be evidence of discriminatory 
animus); Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 227 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding that “it 
is appropriate to tag the employer with an employee’s age-based animus if the evidence 
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in the decision making process.75 Although this standard varies from 
circuit to circuit, it provides the lowest threshold for an employee to 
prove discrimination because each court focuses on assessing the 
causal connection between the subordinate’s act and the ultimate 
adverse employment decision, rather than determining which 
supervisors are covered under strict agency principles.76 
The intermediate standard, the causation standard, focuses both 
on causation and agency law. In EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola,77 the Tenth 
Circuit held that the appropriate test is “whether the biased 
subordinate’s discriminatory reports, recommendation, or other 
actions caused the adverse employment action.”78 Under this 
standard, liability turns on causation and whether the subordinate was 
aided in his or her action by the employment relationship.79 This 
“aided in the action” standard from Ellerth represents a broader view 
of agency principles than the “decision maker only” standard because 
it attaches employer liability to a greater number of supervisory 
employees.80 By focusing on actual causation, the Tenth Circuit 
determined that an independent investigation by the decision maker 
could break the causal connection.81 Nevertheless, the court did not 
provide any clear standards as to what such an independent 
investigation would require.82 
 
 
indicates that the worker possessed leverage, or exerted influence, over the titular 
decisionmaker”); Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(holding that “discriminatory comments . . . made by the key decisionmaker or those in a 
position to influence the decisionmaker” can be evidence of pretext); Griffin v. Wash. 
Convention Ctr., 142 F.3d 1308, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that “evidence of a subordinate’s 
bias is relevant where the ultimate decision maker is not insulated from the subordinate’s 
influence”). 
 75. See Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1323 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(finding that the person harboring animus “participated in the decisions to suspend and 
terminate” employee); Poland v Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1181 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that a 
biased official made the “decision to initiate the administrative inquiry against [the employee] 
and that [biased official’s] animus . . . should be imputed to the [employer]”). 
 76. Madden v. Chattanooga City Wide Serv. Dep’t, 549 F.3d 666, 677 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(finding that when a plaintiff challenges his termination as motivated by a supervisor’s 
discriminatory animus, he must offer evidence of a “causal nexus” between the ultimate 
decision-maker’s decision to terminate the plaintiff and the supervisor’s discriminatory animus). 
 77. EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 450 F.3d 476 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 549 
U.S. 1105, and cert. dismissed, 549 U.S. 1334 (2007). 
 78. Id. at 487. 
 79. Id. at 488. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See id. (lacking a description of what an independent investigation entails). 
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 The Seventh Circuit revisited the cat’s paw problem in Brewer v. 
Board of Trustees of University of Illinois.83 In this Title VII case, the 
court held that in order to impose liability on an employer for the 
actions of a subordinate, the subordinate must have had “such power 
over the nominal decision maker that she is in fact the true, functional 
decision maker.”84 Because a subordinate must exert singular 
influence over the decision maker, any independent investigation by 
the decision maker into the employment situation bars employer 
liability.85 The court explained that it “does not matter that . . . much of 
the information has come from a single, potentially biased source, so 
long as the decision maker does not artificially . . . limit her 
investigation to information from that source.”86 
Due to the variety of standards applied by the circuits, the correct 
test for determining employer liability based on subordinate bias is 
ripe for clarification. Though the Court granted certiorari for BCI 
Coca-Cola, the case was settled and certiorari dismissed.87 Because the 
cat’s paw theory affects a variety of employment discrimination 
statutes, including Title VII and USERRA, the Court most likely will 
seize this opportunity to develop a uniform standard for dealing with 
cases of subordinate bias. 
IV. HOLDING 
In Staub, the Seventh Circuit held that because there was 
insufficient evidence under the singular influence theory to show that 
Mulally or Korenchuk singularly influenced Buck’s decision to fire 
Staub, the jury’s decision should be vacated and judgment entered for 
Proctor.88 The court concluded that although the district court’s jury 
instructions were “not technically wrong” about the correct legal 
standard,89 the lower courts should “determine whether a reasonable 
jury could find singular influence on the evidence to be presented” 
and, if the evidence is insufficient, the animus of non-decision makers 
should not be admitted.90 
 
 83. Brewer v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 84. Id. at 918. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. EEOC, 549 U.S. 1334 (2007) (mem.). 
 88. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647, 659 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 2089 
(U.S. Apr. 19, 2010) (No. 09-400). 
 89. Id. at 657. 
 90. Id. at 658. 
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In explaining the role of the judge to keep prejudicial and 
insufficient evidence from the jury, the Seventh Circuit focused its 
analysis on the cat’s paw theory. Under the standard previously set 
forth in Brewer, the court held again that “[w]here a decision maker is 
not wholly dependent on a single source of information, but instead 
conducts its own investigation into the facts relevant to the decision, 
the employer is not liable for an employee’s submission of 
misinformation to the decision maker.”91 The court was “unprepared 
to find an employer liable based on a nondecisionmaker’s animus 
unless the ‘decisionmaker’ herself held that title only nominally” and 
the subordinate was in fact the true decision maker.92 
The court acknowledged the military animus of Mulally and 
Korenchuk, but asserted that Buck’s independent investigation into 
Staub’s employment meant that a jury could not find the existence of 
singular influence.93 In describing the importance of the independent 
investigation, the court “admit[ted] that Buck’s investigation could 
have been more robust,” but believed that the Brewer standard “does 
not require the decisionmaker to be a paragon of independence.”94 
Had Staub argued in the alternative that Korenchuk was a 
decision maker as well and that this was a traditional discrimination 
case, Buck’s independence under the cat’s paw theory would be 
irrelevant because the jury could find that Korenchuk himself, as a 
decision maker, held military animus and exerted authority in a 
discriminatory manner.95 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit held that 
because Staub did not present this theory at the trial stage, the theory 
was not allowed on appeal because of the uncertainty of the possible 
jury outcome.96 
V. ANALYSIS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING 
Under the Seventh Circuit’s strict singular influence standard—
developed in Brewer for cases involving animus by people other than 
an official decision maker—the court’s ruling in Staub probably was 
correct. It is not clear under this standard that the evidence supported 
Staub’s claim that Buck based her decision solely on the word of 
 
 91. Id. at 656 (quoting Brewer, 479 F.3d at 918). 
 92. Id. at 656. 
 93. Id. at 659. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 655. 
 96. Id. at 655–56. 
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Korenchuk or Mulally, making them the functional decision makers.97 
Additionally, Staub’s personnel file included evidence of behavioral 
problems with other employees that may have caused Buck to fire 
him, regardless of the direct incidents that led to his termination on 
April 20, 2004.98 
Although the Seventh Circuit correctly applied the singular-
influence standard to the facts of the case, the standard itself is 
troubling. The standard only allows for the finding of employer 
liability when the decision maker is a pawn of another employee’s 
discriminatory motivation.99 It may be necessary to protect employers 
from absolute liability based on third party animus, but this pro-
employer standard ignores both the statutory language of USERRA 
and the realities of the workplace.100 Under USERRA, an employee 
only needs to show that his military status was a “motivating factor” 
in his termination.101 The motivating factor should not need to be 
limited to the decision maker’s own animus. Instead, the motivating 
factor language should be interpreted to include any action caused by 
the animus of a subordinate that motivated or led to the ultimate 
termination decision.102 This broader conception of “motivating 
factor” is different from the singular influence standard, which 
essentially seeks to impute the discriminatory motivation of the 
supervisor directly to the decision maker.103 In today’s business world, 
the prevalence of complex managerial structures means that the 
animus of a lower ranked supervisor could influence an ultimate 
employment decision, even if the higher ranked decision maker was 
unaware of the animus or considered other factors. Employees should 
also be protected from this type of discrimination in the workplace. 
Furthermore, the court’s focus on independent investigation has 
no basis in the statute104 and the elements of a sufficient independent 
investigation are unclear.105 Although an independent investigation 
 
 97. Id. at 658–59. 
 98. Id. at 654–55. 
 99. See id. at 656 (“We were, and remain to this day, unprepared to find an employer liable 
based on a nondecisionmaker’s animus unless the ‘decisionmaker’ . . . . just take[s] the monkey’s 
word for it, as it were.”). 
 100. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 101. 38 U.S.C.A. § 4311(c)(1) (West 2011). 
 102. See infra text accompanying notes 161 and 162. 
 103. See id. 
 104. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 4311 (containing no language about an independent investigation). 
 105. See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647, 659 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 
2089 (U.S. Apr. 19, 2010) (No. 09-400) (explaining that Buck’s investigation could have been 
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certainly will break the chain of causation between a subordinate’s 
discriminatory animus and an adverse employment action if the 
employer can prove that the same decision would have been made 
despite the animus, this will not always be the case.106 The Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in Staub leaves open the possibility that any 
independent action on the part of the decision maker will excuse the 
employer from liability—regardless of the extent and depth of the 
investigation, the influence of the animus on the employment action, 
and the authoritative role of the discriminatory subordinates. 
VI. ARGUMENTS 
A. Staub’s (Petitioner’s) and the United States’ Arguments 
Staub’s argument focuses on the role of traditional agency law in 
employment discrimination cases.107 Staub argues that, under 
traditional agency principals, an employer is held liable for the actions 
of its employees when the employees are aided in their conduct by 
their position or are performing duties that have been delegated to 
them by the employer.108 The reasoning behind this principle is that 
when an employer stands to benefit from the expansion of its business 
through the delegation of authority, vicarious liability should attach 
for any negligent or intentional tort that is committed by its agent.109 
Staub believes that agency principles are properly applied in 
employment discrimination cases because a disciplinary decision 
often will be the result of various smaller decisions such as “the 
decision to report an employee,” “investigate an employee,” “initiate a 
disciplinary process,” and “provide any recommendation.”110 The 
employer’s decision to spread these responsibilities among one or 
many employees should not act as a shield from liability. 111 
The United States has considerable interest in this case because of 
its role in creating regulations and enforcing federal anti-
discrimination statutes. Due to this interest, the Solicitor General filed 
 
 
more robust, but was enough because she was not under a singular influence). 
 106. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 56–57. 
 107. Id. at 16–20. 
 108. Id. at 23. 
 109. Id. at 22. 
 110. Id. at 26–27. 
 111. Id. 
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a brief in support of Staub and participated in oral arguments at the 
Court’s invitation.112 
The arguments of the United States echo Staub’s agency 
arguments. The United States advocates that “when an employer 
delegates authority to a supervisor to engage in customary 
employment responsibilities . . . a supervisor’s exercise of that 
authority falls within the scope of the supervisor’s employment” and 
when it “is exercised in a discriminatory manner and causes an 
adverse employment action in violation of USERRA, the employer is 
liable under agency principles . . . .”113 The United States also agrees 
with Staub that under the Ellerth standard, an employer is vicariously 
liable when a supervisor is aided by his agency relationship to take a 
tangible action against a subordinate.114 
Staub contends that the language of USERRA is consistent with 
these traditional agency principals.115 USERRA defines an employer 
as including “a person . . . to whom the employer has delegated the 
performance of employment-related responsibilities”116 and requires 
the plaintiff to show that military service was “a motivating factor in 
the employer’s action.”117 In light of these standards, the singular 
influence analysis is inappropriate because Korenchuk and Mulally 
are liable as Proctor’s agents with supervisory responsibilities whose 
animus influenced Staub’s dismissal.118 Thus, the cat’s paw singular 
influence standard is inconsistent with agency law and, if adopted by 
the Supreme Court, would affect other areas of law, allowing 
companies to hide behind the “good faith” ignorance of a sole 
decision maker.119 
The United States further argues that the singular influence 
standard is incompatible with the Secretary of Labor regulations for 
 
 112. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 130 S. Ct. 573 (2009) (inviting the Solicitor General to file a 
brief expressing the views of the United States). See also Brief for the United States, supra note 
9, at 2. 
 113. Brief for the United States, supra note 9, at 13. 
 114. Id. at 15. 
 115. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 22–24. 
 116. 38 U.S.C.A. § 4303(4)(A)(i) (West 2011). 
 117. Id. § 4311(c)(1). 
 118. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 30–32. 
 119. See id. at 38 (arguing that Proctor should not escape liability merely because it chose to 
divide responsibilities between different levels of management). 
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USERRA.120 Under these regulations, the employee must show only 
that his protected status was a motivating factor and “need not show 
that his or her protected activities or status was the sole cause of the 
employment action . . . .”121 The United States also emphasizes that the 
singular influence standard undermines the deterrent effect of agency 
principles because vicarious liability encourages employers to “select 
their agents carefully.”122 
Staub argues that Proctor’s view of the cat’s paw theory focuses 
incorrectly on the decision maker as the target of liability.123 The 
proper question is not whether liability can be imputed to the 
ultimate decision maker, in this case Buck, but whether liability can 
be imputed to the employer, Proctor.124 Staub urges that it is incorrect 
to focus on whether Buck was the cat’s paw of Mulally and 
Korenchuk; the Court should focus on the discriminatory animus of 
all agents of the employer that may have caused or influenced the 
chain of events that culminated in the final employment decision.125 
Another of Staub’s concerns is that the singular influence 
standard will create a policy that results in decision-making 
capabilities being vested in a single, isolated individual.126 Even worse, 
if an independent investigation is allowed to function as a shield 
against employer liability, the decision of how thorough and 
independent an investigation is largely will be decided by an 
employer, rather than a jury.127 The United States argues that it will 
always be difficult to determine whether the investigation has broken 
the causal chain by looking at the type and source of evidence 
considered, but that the investigation is “relevant only to the extent 
that it sheds light on whether the supervisor’s discriminatory misuse 
of delegated authority was a substantial factor in bringing about an 
adverse employment action, or on whether the adverse action would 
have been taken anyway.”128 Staub believes that the additional 
 
 120. Brief for the United States, supra note 9, at 18–19. 
 121. Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 70 FR 75246, 
75250 (Dec. 19, 2005) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 1002) (emphasis added). 
 122. Brief for the United States, supra note 9, at 19–20. 
 123. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 38. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 38–40. 
 126. Id. at 45–46. 
 127. See id. at 42–44 (arguing that an employer may have the incentive to minimize the 
impact of certain subordinate influences in their independent investigation, but the jury can still 
choose whether or not to accept those accounts as fact). 
 128. Brief for the United States, supra note 9, at 23–24. 
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independent investigation defense takes the decision of whether the 
animus was a motivating factor away from its proper place, the jury.129 
B. Proctor’s (Respondent’s) Arguments 
Respondent Proctor’s argument is largely fact-based and focuses 
on the theory that there was insufficient evidence to establish a causal 
link between the animus of Korenchuk and Mulally, and Buck’s 
ultimate decision to fire Staub.130 Citing standards from the Ninth and 
Eleventh Circuits, Proctor argues that to establish subordinate 
liability, a plaintiff must show not only that a subordinate possesses 
animus and participated in the employment decision, but that his 
recommendation based on animus was the ultimate reason for the 
adverse action, and not the employee’s actions supporting the 
recommendation.131 Proctor argues that if there is nothing an 
employer can do to break the causal chain through an independent 
investigation, then the deterrent effect of vicarious liability will be 
weakened.132 This argument directly opposes Staub’s proposition that 
the deterrent effect is strengthened when an employer is liable for the 
discriminatory actions of its employees.133 
Proctor believes that insufficient evidence links the animus of 
Mulally and Korenchuk to Buck’s decision and that the evidence of 
this animus should not have been submitted to the jury.134 Proctor also 
argues that Buck’s investigation was independent and therefore broke 
the causal chain between the animus that Staub attributes to Mulally 
and Korenchuk, and Staub’s termination.135 In making this argument, 
Proctor emphasizes the other sources that Buck consulted in making 
the decision to terminate Staub,136 the blemishes on Staub’s record 
that were unrelated to any actions of Korenchuk or Mulally,137 and the 
undisputed fact that Buck harbored no military animus.138 Proctor also 
points out that after Staub’s termination, Staub filed a grievance and 
 
 129. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 43–44 (arguing that regardless of the testimony 
of the employer regarding an independent investigation, “[a] jury, of course, would not be 
obligated to accept such accounts”). 
 130. Brief for Respondent at 11–12, Staub v. Proctor Hosp., No. 09-400 (U.S. Aug. 31, 2010). 
 131. Id. at 17–19. 
 132. Id. at 19. 
 133. See supra text accompanying notes 110 and 1111. 
 134. Brief for Respondent, supra note 130, at 31, 38–39. 
 135. Id. at 46. 
 136. Id. at 41–45. 
 137. Id. at 44. 
 138. Id. at 21. 
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Buck independently reviewed his file once more, further breaking any 
remaining causal link.139 
Proctor brings to light a unique aspect of USERRA: the statute 
provides for personal liability as well as employer liability.140 Because 
Buck had no military animus and would not be held personally liable 
for her decision, Proctor contends that “if Buck as Proctor’s agent 
cannot be held liable, Proctor cannot be liable either.”141 Proctor cites 
various circuit court opinions that hold there can be no liability for 
the principal when there is no liability for the agent.142 Thus, under the 
normal vicarious liability principles, the analysis would end and 
Proctor would not be liable.143 Proctor argues that the cat’s paw theory 
gives employees a “second bite at the apple” when they are unable to 
prove that the decision maker had any animus; it allows them to show 
that the decision maker was actually the pawn of another.144 For this 
reason, Proctor believes that the cat’s paw rule departs from the 
traditional rules of vicarious liability by extending to situations in 
which an agent is the dupe of a non-agent.145 
C. Oral Arguments 
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on November 2, 2010 
from Staub, Proctor, and the United States as amicus curiae in 
support of Staub.146 The Court seemed to be most interested in finding 
a middle ground that would allow for some subordinate liability 
without exposing employers to absolute liability for the actions of 
non-decision makers. 
Justices Scalia, Alito, and Kennedy were concerned with the 
possibility of extending liability from certain tangible employment 
actions, in this case termination, to any employment action, such as a 
negative report, by a subordinate.147 Justice Alito commented that 
“what is made illegal are certain employer actions” and expressed a 
hesitancy to extend liability beyond such tangible employment 
 
 139. Id. at 51. 
 140. Id. at 54. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 56. 
 143. Id. at 60. 
 144. Id. at 60–61. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Staub v Proctor Hosp., No. 09-400 (U.S. Nov. 2, 
2010). 
 147. Id. at 5, 21. 
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actions.148 Justice Scalia echoed this concern by asking “why a co-
employee who has a hostile motivation and makes a report to the 
supervisor . . . wouldn’t qualify as well”?149 Justice Alito proposed that 
the test might be “whether [the supervisor was] delegated some of the 
responsibility for the challenged action.”150 Similarly, Justice Kennedy 
was concerned that extending liability to non-tangible subordinate 
actions would create a sweeping rule that imposed almost absolute 
liability on the employer regardless of his efforts to independently 
investigate the employment situation.151 Justice Kennedy suggested 
applying traditional tort law to establish whether, in the case of two 
actors who both contributed to a particular result, one negligent and 
one not, there was a substantial contribution by the negligent actor, 
rather than using a singular influence test.152 
Justice Sotomayor and Chief Justice Roberts focused on the issue 
of causation. Justice Sotomayor questioned the requisite materiality 
of the discriminatory animus in influencing the ultimate employment 
decision.153 She asked whether the discriminatory act needed to play a 
substantial role, material role, or simply any role in the adverse 
employment action to be deemed a “motivating factor,” therein 
acknowledging that the ultimate decision maker is not acting in a 
vacuum and must depend on information she receives from others.154 
Staub explained that from the different standards articulated in Price 
Waterhouse, Congress purposefully chose “motivating factor,” rather 
than “substantial motivating factor.”155 The United States expressed 
the view that the motivating factor language represented proximate 
causation, and that the animus can be “one of many factors, but . . . 
does need to be more than a trivial or de minim[i]s factor.”156 
Chief Justice Roberts questioned the extent to which an 
independent intervening cause would sever the connection between 
the subordinate’s animus and the employment decision.157 He also 
commented that the Seventh Circuit’s cat’s paw standard of 
 
 148. Id. at 5. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 21. 
 151. Id. at 8–9. 
 152. Id. at 42–43. 
 153. Id. at 12–13. 
 154. Id. at 13, 32. 
 155. Id. at 13. 
 156. Id. at 17. 
 157. Id. at 22. 
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subordinate domination over the decision maker appears to be a 
“more stringent test” than the motivating factor language of the 
statute.158 Justices Sotomayor and Ginsberg expressed dissatisfaction 
with the independent investigation standard and the lack of guidance 
for determining how detailed and thorough an independent 
investigation must be in order for an employer to avoid liability.159 
Justice Breyer asked whether there should be a special rule for 
subordinate liability at all, proposing to simply focus on whether an 
act was a motivating factor or proximate cause.160 Rather than 
attempting to analyze the motivations of the ultimate decision maker 
or assess how much influence a subordinate had over her, Breyer 
suggested that the correct test is to determine whether the animus was 
a motivating factor of the action that caused the termination.161 
Similarly, Justice Scalia questioned whether a motivating factor refers 
to the motive of the person who made the decision, or simply a factor 
that was relevant to or influenced the decision.162 He indicated that 
the Court might not be convinced that it refers to the motives of the 
person who made the decision.163 
Oral arguments concluded with Staub suggesting that if the Court 
so chose, it could decide the case on narrower principles based on the 
purposes of USERRA.164 In response to an inquiry by Justice Alito, 
Staub suggested that because USERRA’s animating purpose is to 
“minimize the disadvantages to civilian careers that can result from 
service in the military,” and because employers have an economic 
incentive not to employee reservists, the Court could decide this case 
by focusing entirely on purpose, thereby limiting this decision’s effect 
on other employment discrimination statutes.165 
VII. LIKELY DISPOSITION 
Given the circuit split over the correct standard for subordinate-
based employer liability and the number of federal statutes affected 
by the cat’s paw theory, the Supreme Court most likely will attempt to 
 
 158. Id. at 31. 
 159. Id. at 27–28. 
 160. Id. at 34–35. 
 161. Id. at 39–40. 
 162. Id. at 36–38. 
 163. Id. at 39. 
 164. Id. at 48–50. 
 165. Id. at 47–49. 
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fashion a standard that will have effects beyond USERRA. Although 
Staub raised the option (in oral arguments) of deciding this case 
based on the statutory purpose of USERRA alone, it is unlikely that 
the Court will give up the opportunity to create a uniform rule after 
missing one in BCI Coca-Cola. 
In creating a uniform standard, the Court likely will look for a 
middle ground between the narrow singular influence standard used 
by the Seventh Circuit and the broad influence or input standard used 
by several other circuits. During oral arguments, the Court seemed 
dissatisfied with the extremes presented by both sides—establishing a 
threshold that would be too high for most plaintiffs to meet given the 
changing landscape of company policies and sizes or calling for 
sweeping employer liability.166 The Court likely will base its decision 
on principles of agency law, causation, and a decision maker’s 
independent investigation. 
Given the Court’s decision in Ellerth, the Court once again will 
probably apply the agency standard that an employer is liable for the 
action of a subordinate when the subordinate was aided in his action 
by the employment relationship.167 Under this standard, the biased 
subordinate would not need to have any official decision-making 
capacity as long as he used his delegated supervisory powers to 
influence or affect an official decision.168 
During oral arguments the Court questioned the level of 
causation needed to establish liability. The Court seemed to consider 
that the motivating factor language could refer not only to the 
mentality of the biased subordinate that took the action, but also to 
the effects of the employment action itself on the ultimate decision.169 
The Court appeared to reject the standard that the employer could be 
held liable when subordinate bias only nominally affected the 
employment decision. Rather, the justices likely will focus on 
proximate causation and the materiality or substantial nature of the 
bias in affecting the ultimate decision.170 
Finally, the issue of a decision maker’s independent investigation 
is also likely to play a role in the Court’s decision. No clear standard 
 
 166. Id. at 11. 
 167. See supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text. 
 168. See id. 
 169. See supra text accompanying note 162. 
 170. See supra text accompanying notes 153–156. 
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has been set for how thorough an employer’s independent 
investigation needs to be to avoid liability.171 Most employment 
discrimination cases are extremely fact intensive and it may be hard 
to create a uniform standard that will apply to all employers given the 
differences in size and organizational structures. Although it may be 
easy to decide a standard based on the facts of this case, it is unlikely 
that the Court will choose to rule on this case without considering the 
potential effects on other cases and discrimination statutes. 
As Justice Breyer suggested in oral arguments, there may be no 
need to create a new rule for subordinate liability.172 If the Court 
chooses to apply the same agency standards in subordinate liability as 
it did in Ellerth for cases involving harassment, then the causation 
standard and independent investigation problem could be dealt with 
within the Price Waterhouse framework used for mixed-motives 
cases.173 Under this test, the plaintiff would have the burden of 
showing that the action of the supervisor was a motivating factor or 
proximate cause of the adverse employment decision.174 Once this 
burden is satisfied and the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, 
the burden shifts to the employer to establish that the same decision 
would have been made regardless of the employee’s protected 
status.175 In doing so, the employer could introduce evidence showing 
that an independent investigation was conducted. The fact finder 
would then determine whether, within the specificities of each case, 
the investigation was sufficient to break the chain of causation. The 
application of the preexisting Price Waterhouse test to cases of 
subordinate bias would allow more plaintiffs to survive summary 
judgment, but would not create sweeping liability for employers. 
Employers would still be able to win at the summary judgment stage 
if the plaintiff was unable to establish that the subordinate’s bias 
played a causal role in the adverse employment action. 
Studies have shown that recently, fewer plaintiffs make it to trial 
in employment discrimination cases and those that do succeed less 
often than plaintiffs in previous years.176 Against this backdrop, and 
 
 171. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 146, at 27 (Justices Sotomayor and 
Ginsburg questioned Proctor on what an independent investigation must consist of for an 
employer to avoid liability.). 
 172. Id. at 34–35. 
 173. See supra notes 51–56 and accompanying text. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in 
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due to the policies behind federal anti-discrimination statutes, it is 
likely that the Court will choose a middle path that allows for 
employees to succeed in their discrimination suits without creating 
absolute liability for the employer that extends to any action by a 
person not vested with decision-making authority. Although there 
may still be a place for the singular influence standard in those rare 
cases where the person with animus has no supervisory authority 
whatsoever, the Court’s previous applications of agency law in the 
employment discrimination context indicate that this strict standard is 
entirely inappropriate for the more common discrimination claims 
involving supervisors. 
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